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Abstract 
 
IoT, crowd sensing and smart cities will be a traffic challenge. New communication paradigms as 
asynchronous messaging carry and forward, scheduled delivery and temporary storage will be needed to 
manage network resources dynamically. Since traditional end to end security will require keeping security 
associations among devices for a long time draining valuable resources, we propose and evaluate the use of 
proxy re-encryption protocols in these scenarios as a solution for reliable and flexible security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet of Things and other upcoming concepts as Smart Cities and Crowd Sensing depend on the 
available context information to deliver the appropriate quality. It can be considered the richest the 
information is, the better. Due to this, the purpose for devices to rely on the cloud is twofold: to process 
more information than they can on their own and to benefit from the information others push to the cloud.   
 
These scenarios will influence the network as we know today. The information that flows to the cloud may 
be sensitive so it is important to set the appropriate security grounds to ensure only authorized recipients 
receive the data. Moreover, the huge amount of data currently flowing from devices to the cloud will 
increase in the near future whereas the outcome of that data processing, flowing from the cloud to the 
devices, will be smaller leading to an asymmetry. Finally, it should be considered that millions of devices 
sending data to several recipients over the network cannot be coordinated globally so alternative 
communication schemas should be considered to avoid collapsing the network. This entails considering 
asynchronous, unacknowledged, delayed delivery and carry-forward protocols. This work describes the use 
of proxy re-encryption protocols in these scenarios to handle asynchronous message driven 
communications as a solution. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
The proxy re-encryption is based on the notion of "atomic proxy cryptography". It was first introduced in 
[1]. Basically, this technology proposes the use of a semi-trusted proxy that transforms a cipher text for 
Alice into a cipher text for Bob without actually accessing the plaintext. Popular well-known approaches to 
proxy re-encryption are BBS (Blaze, Bleumer & Strauss) [2] and AFGH (Ateniese, Fu, Green & 
Hohenberger) [3]. BBS is based on ElGamal. In BBS, the proxy, knowing the key for Alice to Bob 
direction, can derive the key for Bob to Alice direction as the multiplicative inverse. This is not a feature 
but a problem since the proxy that can be untrusted, does not need additional information to derive the 
inverse Moreover, to accomplish bidirectional communication two keys (direct and inverse) should be kept 
since deriving the inverse every time is computationally expensive. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Data from device D2 is stored in an untrusted cloud 
and eventually delivered to Cloud A and B without compromising the data 
 
 
AFGH is based on Bilinear maps and a proxy knowing the transformation key for one direction cannot 
derive the opposite direction key from it. Moreover, a message that has been encrypted for proxy re-
encryption with AFGH can be recovered by the origin before and after proxy re-encryption permitting the 
source to recover, forward or re-encrypt a message for another destination if network conditions change 
again as it may happen in dynamic scenarios. 
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III. ARCHITECTURE AND OPERATION 
 
We have modeled an IoT environment as a topology free system composed by different nodes. Every node 
can communicate with others directly or by means of intermediary nodes. Nodes can be used to model 
sensors, actuator, end user devices and intermediary systems ass communication gateways or M2M 
gateways. Moreover, nodes are also used to model the destination cloud nodes that collect the data for 
performing data analytics or business intelligence.  
 
In order to characterize existing automation, sensor/actuator systems, nodes can be grouped in different 
topologies as line, mesh, tree or bus and connected too other devices using any topology through other 
nodes. When it comes to the security we have defined three different roles that can be assumed by any 
node in the system: endpoint nodes, key manager and re-encryption proxy. The endpoint nodes are nodes 
exchanging data trough untrusted networks. The key manager is the node acting as a key directory so a 
given source can find the destination public key using any addressing mechanism. The re-encryption proxy 
is the entity actually performing the re-encryption that may also group, store or delay messages according 
to a network policy or may also re-encrypt for alternative destinations if necessary. 
 
Consider the scenario in Fig. 2. Devices in the trusted network communicate directly with the Destination 
Cloud A (CA) but upon a failure or a change in the network conditions that cloud becomes unreachable.  
Due to that the traffic should be re-routed through an untrusted network to a Destination Cloud B (CB) and 
will be eventually sent to CA. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Alternative delivery if data through an untrusted cloud upon a failure 
 
For simplicity we consider all the traffic will be originated by    in the trusted network, processed by the 
proxy and re-encrypted for   . Both    and    have a key pair. And thus both of them have calculated 
prime numbers q and r.    and    send their public key to key manager.    fetches the public key of    
from the key manger and computes the re-encryption key           as: 
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Where        is the private key and   a random integer belonging   ; and       
        the 
public key. Once calculated,    sends         to the proxy. When    wants to send a message M and 
encrypt it to    it computer the cipher text         as: 
 
                   
                
                        (2) 
 
 
 
 4/5 
 
   sends the encrypted message to the proxy. The proxy can store the messages to be delivered later, start 
sending the messages immediately or wait for any change in the destination (that would require a new RK 
to be computed). To illustrate the process, let's suppose the proxy re-encrypts the messages to the 
destination (  ) and delivers them. To do so it should compute         as 
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Finally,    can acquire the original message M as follows: 
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
There are three important aspects for using proxy re-encryption in several scenarios under the scope of IoT, 
the first is the cost of the generation of the public and private key. There are several studies showing 
nowadays small processors are able to generate those parameters with no effort. The second important 
aspect to consider is the cost of generating the re-encryption key material since it may happen frequently in 
dynamic scenarios. Finally, the most worrying one is the cost of generating the encrypted message to 
enable proxy re-encryption. We have simulated several scenarios and collected data to analyze the impact 
of these three aspects. In this paper we show the cost of generating the encrypted messages can be 
prohibitive for long keys (q/r parameters) taking up to 25 seconds per messages (of the maximum size 
allowed by the key). However, shorter keys give and appropriate degree of privacy whereas keep the 
encrypted message generation time short enough to be useful for non-critical applications (and low traffic). 
 
 
 
 
 5/5 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Encryption time calculated 1000 times for different key lengths 
 
 
We have stated these scenarios will prevail new challenges to future networks being paradigms as 
asynchronous messaging, carry and forward, scheduled delivery and temporary storage needed to manage 
network resources appropriately. Moreover, privacy will be critical for the adoption of new services. We 
have shown proxy re-encryption is an interesting tool for turning these scenarios into reality and we have 
tested the impact in these scenarios mimicking computing resources present in IoT devices. We finally 
came to the conclusion that a correct study on the necessary degree of security (key length) and the 
expected traffic will make proxy re-encryption usable and interesting for new services. 
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